Copernican Revolution . org
Transforming Our Lives through Self Reflection and Psychology
A psychology professor's collection of lessons fostering self-discovery through online activities, hands-on classroom experiences, engaging lectures, and effective discussion prompts.
Pedagogical Essay by Katie Hope Grobman
Carol Gilligan - In a Different Voice
Discussion lesson of Carol Gilligan's In a Different Voice to appreciate debate in moral psychology and learn some psychology of gender.
As an undergraduate, before finding Psychology, I explored. Big questions about the meaning in life and how we know what we know drew me to Philosophy.
One day, at our Philosophy Club meeting, feminine ethics came up, in a kinda' dismissing "this is simplistic" way. It's essentially like Carol Gilligan's ethics of care. I found feminine ethics very compelling. So much so, a friend started calling me a "girl philosopher." A joke, but still, it says something, about her, and about what the field was like at the time.
One day, at our Philosophy Club meeting, feminine ethics came up, in a kinda' dismissing "this is simplistic" way. It's essentially like Carol Gilligan's ethics of care. I found feminine ethics very compelling. So much so, a friend started calling me a "girl philosopher." A joke, but still, it says something, about her, and about what the field was like at the time.
Take What You Need
“
When I was a boy and I would see scary things in the news, my mother would say to me, "Look for the helpers. You will always find people who are helping." To this day, especially in times of disaster, I remember my mother's words and I am always comforted by realizing that there are sill so many helpers - so many caring people in this world.
What Do We Owe Each Other? A discussion of Carol Gilligan's Ethics of Care.
"What do we owe each other?," The Good Place asks us repeatedly. Chidi, the moral philosopher character, means the question differently than I interpret it. He shares real-life moral philosopher T.M. Scalon's approach. Scanlon (1998) sees morality like a contract we have with others to make our choices in a way others would agree makes sense. It reminds me of Jake's reasoning about the Heinz dilemma in Carol Gilligan's (1982) Ethics of Care. But, to me, the question is like how Amy understands the Heinz Dilemma. To me, caring is a given. How to be caring is our question. To me, the world would be so much better off if we cared more. But too much altruism becomes burn out, people with insincere motives manipulate our compassion as a means to immoral ends, and our minds and childhoods can twist our own empathy into dysfunctional enabling.
College students don't need professors to ignite their passion about morality; it's an intrinsically fascinating topic with self-evident real-world implications. I feel we can use our natural passion to teach about important abstract concepts in Psychology, like normative bias and how our theories can shape our data interpretation to become self-fulfilling prophecies of our stereotypes. It's challenging to be a good scientist!
When I cover moral psychology, I like to share how debates in our field unfold, with a focus on comparing Lawrence Kohlberg's (1969) classic stages of moral reasoning with Carol Gilligan's critique of what she sees as psychology's masculine bias, and another voice.
College students don't need professors to ignite their passion about morality; it's an intrinsically fascinating topic with self-evident real-world implications. I feel we can use our natural passion to teach about important abstract concepts in Psychology, like normative bias and how our theories can shape our data interpretation to become self-fulfilling prophecies of our stereotypes. It's challenging to be a good scientist!
When I cover moral psychology, I like to share how debates in our field unfold, with a focus on comparing Lawrence Kohlberg's (1969) classic stages of moral reasoning with Carol Gilligan's critique of what she sees as psychology's masculine bias, and another voice.
Kohlberg's Moral Stages
Building upon Jean Piaget's stages, Lawrence Kohlberg created a stage theory of moral reasoning. He presents participants moral dilemmas without easy answers. The most famous of Kohlberg's dilemmas is the Heinz dilemma:
In Europe, a woman was near death from a special kind of cancer. There was one drug that the doctor thought might save her. It was a form of radium that a druggist in the same town had recently discovered. The drug was expensive to make, but the druggist was charging ten times what the drug cost him to make. He paid $200 for the radium and charged $2000 for a small dose of the drug. The sick woman’s husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to borrow the money, but he could only get together about $1000, which is half of what it cost. He told the druggist that his wife was dying, and asked him to sell it cheaper or let him pay later. But the druggist said ‘No, I discovered the drug and I’m going to make money from it.’ So Heinz got desperate and broke into the man’s store to steal the drug for his wife. Should Heinz have done that? Why or why not?
Kohlberg doesn't consider persons' conclusions nearly as important as their thinking process. So regardless of somebody's original answer, an experimenter keeps asking questions in a clinical interview style to uncover the deepest level of reasoning a participant can bring to the dilemma.
Figure 1. Summary of Kohlberg's stages, adapted from Colby et al., 1983.
Some evidence for Kohlberg's stages can be compelling. In a longitudinal study shows from early childhood until about our mid-twenties, we see boys and men progress to higher and higher stages (e.g., Colby et al., 1983). Stage of moral reasoning predicts moral behaviors (Kohlberg & Candee, 1984), like more helping others (Blasi, 1980) and less delinquency (Jurkovic, 1980), and its especially true at higher stages (e.g., Kutnick, 1985). Cross-culturally, in a study of 26 countries and 44 cultures, stages proceed in age-related order (Kohlberg, 1969). But notably we see less industrialized cultures proceed more slowly and rarely achieving higher stages (Snarey, 1985).
Since stages are rankings, we can expect some groups to score 'higher' than others, and cultural bias is only one of several potentially contentious concerns. We similarly have findings like men outperforming women (e.g., Walker, 1984). In particular, many studies of the 60's and 70's show boys proceed faster through moral stages so by adolescence, boys are typically in stage 4 while girls are still in stage 3 (e.g., Haan et al, 1976; Holstein, 1976; Kohlberg, 1969).
A provocative question to end a class segment about Kohlberg's model, and an opportunity to motivate reading the excerpts of Gilligan for next class. I scaffold our conversation starting with more factual questions.. As we proceed, answers are more debatable and I let students guide discussion, usually only adding points to make sure different perspectives become clear.
Since stages are rankings, we can expect some groups to score 'higher' than others, and cultural bias is only one of several potentially contentious concerns. We similarly have findings like men outperforming women (e.g., Walker, 1984). In particular, many studies of the 60's and 70's show boys proceed faster through moral stages so by adolescence, boys are typically in stage 4 while girls are still in stage 3 (e.g., Haan et al, 1976; Holstein, 1976; Kohlberg, 1969).
So are boys more morally sophisticated than girls?
A provocative question to end a class segment about Kohlberg's model, and an opportunity to motivate reading the excerpts of Gilligan for next class. I scaffold our conversation starting with more factual questions.. As we proceed, answers are more debatable and I let students guide discussion, usually only adding points to make sure different perspectives become clear.
Different Moral Voices?
Carol Gilligan (1982) proposes the answer is, "no." Boys are not more morally sophisticated than girls. Rather, there are different approaches to morality, different 'voices' we can speak with. Kohlberg measures a single moral voice we can develop, but girls and women are more likely to speak in a different voice.
What are these different voices?
What are these different voices?
Figure 2. compare and contrast Kohlberg's Ethics of Justice and Gilligan's Ethics of Care.
Moral Voices and the Heinz Dilemma
Carol Gilligan describes two 11 year olds, Jake and Amy, as they answer interview questions about the Heinz dilemma.
How would you summarize each child's answers and experience of the interview?
Jake thinks Heinz should steal the drug. He understands the dilemma, like Kohlberg, as a conflict between rights to property and life. The interviewer keeps asking Jake questions and he responds confidently, thinking the interview is, "sort of like a math problem with humans." Jake is sophisticated enough to know laws have a purpose, but can't account for every situation, so the judge, "should give Heinz the lightest possible sentence," presumably because the judge recognizes the same moral math problem as he does.
Amy thinks Heinz shouldn't steal the drug because there are other solutions, like borrowing money, getting a loan, and just convincing the druggist to notice his wife's suffering. Surely the druggist would accommodate if he understood. "They should really just talk it out and find some other way to make the money." To Amy it's, "not a math problem with humans but a narrative of relationships that extends over time." She worries if Heinz stole the drug, "he might have to go to jail, and then his wife might get sicker again, and he couldn't get more of the drug, and it might not be good." Despite answering coherently, Amy loses confidence when the interviewer's planned questions feel repetitive and don't elaborate her view.
How would you summarize each child's answers and experience of the interview?
Jake thinks Heinz should steal the drug. He understands the dilemma, like Kohlberg, as a conflict between rights to property and life. The interviewer keeps asking Jake questions and he responds confidently, thinking the interview is, "sort of like a math problem with humans." Jake is sophisticated enough to know laws have a purpose, but can't account for every situation, so the judge, "should give Heinz the lightest possible sentence," presumably because the judge recognizes the same moral math problem as he does.
Amy thinks Heinz shouldn't steal the drug because there are other solutions, like borrowing money, getting a loan, and just convincing the druggist to notice his wife's suffering. Surely the druggist would accommodate if he understood. "They should really just talk it out and find some other way to make the money." To Amy it's, "not a math problem with humans but a narrative of relationships that extends over time." She worries if Heinz stole the drug, "he might have to go to jail, and then his wife might get sicker again, and he couldn't get more of the drug, and it might not be good." Despite answering coherently, Amy loses confidence when the interviewer's planned questions feel repetitive and don't elaborate her view.
Self Fullfilling Prophecy in Kohlberg's Clinical Interview?
Are you convinced the interview's structure is biased against voices differing from Kohlberg's?
I personally feel Gilligan's Jake and Amy evidence is incredibly compelling, showing us how Kohlberg's clinical interview structure is framing dilemmas like Heinz's one way and only allowing that way to be elaborated.
I try to mindful students, colleagues, and anybody can find different evidence compelling. To me, my goal as a teacher isn't to convince others I'm right, but to get my students thinking. A follow up question could be, "what kind of evidence would you find compelling?"
I personally feel Gilligan's Jake and Amy evidence is incredibly compelling, showing us how Kohlberg's clinical interview structure is framing dilemmas like Heinz's one way and only allowing that way to be elaborated.
I try to mindful students, colleagues, and anybody can find different evidence compelling. To me, my goal as a teacher isn't to convince others I'm right, but to get my students thinking. A follow up question could be, "what kind of evidence would you find compelling?"
Gendered Voices and Moral Voices
Are you convinced there's a gender difference?
Gilligan convinces me of a pervasive gender bias in Psychology generally and specifically of approaching moral psychology how Kohlberg does. But I'm personally disconcerted with the idea we each have a moral voice and it's gendered. When we interview people about moral dilemmas, we can easily hear appeals to fairness and appeals to compassion. But when we interview with multiple dilemmas, few people consistently use either one voice or the other (e.g., Walker et al., 1987; Miller at el., 2018). To me, we don't have a moral voice. We have many moral voices inside us, and something inside us helps us choose which we make audible.
Like previously mentioned, numerous studies using Kohlberg's approach show a gender difference favoring men and boys. Similarly, numerous studies show women and girls have greater empathy than men and boys (e.g., Davis & Franzoi 1991; Lawrence et al., 2004; Muncer & Ling, 2006).
it's just so easy to turn statistical differences into categorical stereotypes. In a meta-analysis of moral orientation, men favor justice (r2=01, d=0.19) and women favor care (r2=02, d=0.28) (Jaffee & Hyde, 2000). But these differences only account for a few percent of variance in our responses. And over the years, the gender differences are getting smaller (e.g., Turiel, 1998).
On the other hand, maybe we do have somewhat gendered moral voices because the effect size of moral orientation grows when participants share their own personal moral dilemmas (Jaffee & Hyde, 2000). In a sense, this is Gilligan's biggest point, there is, "a difference between the way psychologists talked about the self and about morality, and the way people actually experience it (Kitzinger & Gilligan, 1994)." I probably find Ethics of Care so compelling because when I hear a question like, "what do we owe each other" my mind instantly goes to deeply personal struggles throughout my life.
Gilligan convinces me of a pervasive gender bias in Psychology generally and specifically of approaching moral psychology how Kohlberg does. But I'm personally disconcerted with the idea we each have a moral voice and it's gendered. When we interview people about moral dilemmas, we can easily hear appeals to fairness and appeals to compassion. But when we interview with multiple dilemmas, few people consistently use either one voice or the other (e.g., Walker et al., 1987; Miller at el., 2018). To me, we don't have a moral voice. We have many moral voices inside us, and something inside us helps us choose which we make audible.
Like previously mentioned, numerous studies using Kohlberg's approach show a gender difference favoring men and boys. Similarly, numerous studies show women and girls have greater empathy than men and boys (e.g., Davis & Franzoi 1991; Lawrence et al., 2004; Muncer & Ling, 2006).
it's just so easy to turn statistical differences into categorical stereotypes. In a meta-analysis of moral orientation, men favor justice (r2=01, d=0.19) and women favor care (r2=02, d=0.28) (Jaffee & Hyde, 2000). But these differences only account for a few percent of variance in our responses. And over the years, the gender differences are getting smaller (e.g., Turiel, 1998).
On the other hand, maybe we do have somewhat gendered moral voices because the effect size of moral orientation grows when participants share their own personal moral dilemmas (Jaffee & Hyde, 2000). In a sense, this is Gilligan's biggest point, there is, "a difference between the way psychologists talked about the self and about morality, and the way people actually experience it (Kitzinger & Gilligan, 1994)." I probably find Ethics of Care so compelling because when I hear a question like, "what do we owe each other" my mind instantly goes to deeply personal struggles throughout my life.
Normative Bias
Once we establish what's "normal," we tend to see it as how things are "supposed" to be. Gilligan notes of Kohlberg take fairness as the "normal" was we understand morality and in his and other's interpretations, his "normal" because the measuring stick others get judged by too. Carol Gilligan sees this as a normative bias and describes several others in Psychology.
How do you feel about Gilligan's examples of normative bias?
Gilligan discusses children's play as a teacher or morals (Jean Piaget, George Mean, & Janet Lever), Erik Erikson's stage model placing identity before intimacy, and how we handle competition and motivation (Marina Horner & David McClelland)
What others examples of normative bias, come to mind, about gender or anything, in Psychology or beyond?
Please see my lesson, Understanding Normative Bias in Psychology to Better Appreciate Ourselves and Others, for many concrete examples.
How do you feel about Gilligan's examples of normative bias?
Gilligan discusses children's play as a teacher or morals (Jean Piaget, George Mean, & Janet Lever), Erik Erikson's stage model placing identity before intimacy, and how we handle competition and motivation (Marina Horner & David McClelland)
What others examples of normative bias, come to mind, about gender or anything, in Psychology or beyond?
Please see my lesson, Understanding Normative Bias in Psychology to Better Appreciate Ourselves and Others, for many concrete examples.
Conclusions
Like any science, Moral Psychology is hard to do well. And since it's about something so personal and precious to so many of us, being scientific about morality is exceptionally challenging. We have looked at an example with the different moral orientations put forth by Lawrence Kohlberg and Carol Gilligan. The details make a compelling story. But I hope we each step back and look at it more holistically. In a sense, this is Gilligan's biggest point, there is, "a difference between the way psychologists talked about the self and about morality, and the way people actually experience it (Kitzinger & Gilligan, 1994)."
As I reflect, I notice a paradox in myself It bothers me simplifying morality to two voice and making them about gender feels like a stereotype. And yet, I know, Ethics of Care is incredibly compelling to me, because when I heard the question, "what do we owe each other," my mind didn't hone in on "owe" as though we're talking about a contractual obligation. That would be an ethics of justice. Rather, my mind instantly goes to deeply personal moral struggles throughout my life, like should I have risked being hurt more so I could have maybe been more successful helping others.
As I reflect, I notice a paradox in myself It bothers me simplifying morality to two voice and making them about gender feels like a stereotype. And yet, I know, Ethics of Care is incredibly compelling to me, because when I heard the question, "what do we owe each other," my mind didn't hone in on "owe" as though we're talking about a contractual obligation. That would be an ethics of justice. Rather, my mind instantly goes to deeply personal moral struggles throughout my life, like should I have risked being hurt more so I could have maybe been more successful helping others.
References
Blasi, A. (1980). The moral sense of personality: A theoretical framework and review of the literature. Journal of Moral Education, 10(2), 82-98.
Colby, A., Gibbs, J. C., Lieberman, M., & Kohlberg, L. (1983). A longitudinal study of moral judgment. Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development, 48(1/2), 1-96.
Davis, H., & Franzoi, S. L. (1991). Stability and change in adolescent self-consciousness and empathy. Journal of Research in Personality, 25(4), 392-400.
Gilligan, C. (1982). In a different voice: Psychological theory and women's development. Harvard University Press.
Haan, N., Smith, M. B., & Block, J. (1976). Moral reasoning of young adults: Political-social behavior, family background, and personality correlates. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 34(5), 925-935.
Holstein, C. B. (1976). Development of moral judgment: A longitudinal study of males and females. Child Development, 47(1), 51-61.
Jaffee, S., & Hyde, J. S. (2000). Gender differences in moral orientation: A meta-analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 126(5), 703-726.
Jurkovic, G. J. (1980). The juvenile delinquent as a moral philosopher: A structural-developmental perspective. Psychology Today, 14(7), 72-80.
Kitzinger, C., & Gilligan, C. (1994). Listening to a different voice. Fem inism and Psychology, 4, 408-419.
Kohlberg, L., & Candee, D. (1984). The relationship of moral judgment to moral action. In W. M. Kurtines & J. L. Gewirtz (Eds.), Morality, moral behavior, and moral development (pp. 52-73). John Wiley & Sons.
Kohlberg, L. (1969). Stage and sequence: The cognitive-developmental approach to socialization. In D. A. Goslin (Ed.), Handbook of socialization theory and research (pp. 347-480). Rand McNally & Co.
Kutnick, P. J. (1985). Social cognition and prosocial development. Journal of Early Adolescence, 5(4), 367-390.
Lawrence, E. J., Shaw, P., Baker, D., et al. (2004). Measuring empathy: reliability and validity of the empathy quotient. Psychological Medicine, 34, 911–919.
Miller, P. J., Hahn, E. K., Jones, S. M., Fortunato, A., Chantung, Y., Mazurek, C. J., ... & Gaskins, S. (2018). Cognition and moral development: The influences of parenting, socialization, and culture on children’s moral judgments and behavior. Frontiers in Psychology, 9, 567.
Muncer, S. J., & Ling, J. (2006). Psychometric analysis of the Defining Issues Test: Is the DIT unidimensional? Journal of Business Ethics, 64(3), 213-224.
Scanlon, T. (1998). What we owe to each other. Harvard University Press.
Snarey, J. R. (1985). Cross-cultural universality of social-moral development: A critical review of Kohlbergian research. Psychological Bulletin, 97(2), 202-232.
Turiel, E. (1998). The development of morality. In W. Damon (Ed.), Handbook of child psychology: Vol. 3. Social, emotional, and personality development (5th ed., pp. 863-932). John Wiley & Sons Inc.
Walker, L. J., DeVries, B., & Trevethan, S. D. (1987). Moral stages and moral orientations in real-life and hypothetical dilemmas. Child Development, 58(3), 842-858.
Walker, L. J. (1984). Sex differences in the development of moral reasoning: A critical review.
Colby, A., Gibbs, J. C., Lieberman, M., & Kohlberg, L. (1983). A longitudinal study of moral judgment. Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development, 48(1/2), 1-96.
Davis, H., & Franzoi, S. L. (1991). Stability and change in adolescent self-consciousness and empathy. Journal of Research in Personality, 25(4), 392-400.
Gilligan, C. (1982). In a different voice: Psychological theory and women's development. Harvard University Press.
Haan, N., Smith, M. B., & Block, J. (1976). Moral reasoning of young adults: Political-social behavior, family background, and personality correlates. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 34(5), 925-935.
Holstein, C. B. (1976). Development of moral judgment: A longitudinal study of males and females. Child Development, 47(1), 51-61.
Jaffee, S., & Hyde, J. S. (2000). Gender differences in moral orientation: A meta-analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 126(5), 703-726.
Jurkovic, G. J. (1980). The juvenile delinquent as a moral philosopher: A structural-developmental perspective. Psychology Today, 14(7), 72-80.
Kitzinger, C., & Gilligan, C. (1994). Listening to a different voice. Fem inism and Psychology, 4, 408-419.
Kohlberg, L., & Candee, D. (1984). The relationship of moral judgment to moral action. In W. M. Kurtines & J. L. Gewirtz (Eds.), Morality, moral behavior, and moral development (pp. 52-73). John Wiley & Sons.
Kohlberg, L. (1969). Stage and sequence: The cognitive-developmental approach to socialization. In D. A. Goslin (Ed.), Handbook of socialization theory and research (pp. 347-480). Rand McNally & Co.
Kutnick, P. J. (1985). Social cognition and prosocial development. Journal of Early Adolescence, 5(4), 367-390.
Lawrence, E. J., Shaw, P., Baker, D., et al. (2004). Measuring empathy: reliability and validity of the empathy quotient. Psychological Medicine, 34, 911–919.
Miller, P. J., Hahn, E. K., Jones, S. M., Fortunato, A., Chantung, Y., Mazurek, C. J., ... & Gaskins, S. (2018). Cognition and moral development: The influences of parenting, socialization, and culture on children’s moral judgments and behavior. Frontiers in Psychology, 9, 567.
Muncer, S. J., & Ling, J. (2006). Psychometric analysis of the Defining Issues Test: Is the DIT unidimensional? Journal of Business Ethics, 64(3), 213-224.
Scanlon, T. (1998). What we owe to each other. Harvard University Press.
Snarey, J. R. (1985). Cross-cultural universality of social-moral development: A critical review of Kohlbergian research. Psychological Bulletin, 97(2), 202-232.
Turiel, E. (1998). The development of morality. In W. Damon (Ed.), Handbook of child psychology: Vol. 3. Social, emotional, and personality development (5th ed., pp. 863-932). John Wiley & Sons Inc.
Walker, L. J., DeVries, B., & Trevethan, S. D. (1987). Moral stages and moral orientations in real-life and hypothetical dilemmas. Child Development, 58(3), 842-858.
Walker, L. J. (1984). Sex differences in the development of moral reasoning: A critical review.
Citation
Grobman, K. H. (2021). What Do We Owe Each Other? A discussion of Carol Gilligan's Ethics of Care. CopernicanRevolution.org. (Originally published 2004, DevPsy.org; revised)
Grobman, K. H. (2021). What Do We Owe Each Other? A discussion of Carol Gilligan's Ethics of Care. CopernicanRevolution.org. (Originally published 2004, DevPsy.org; revised)
